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The Apple operating system (iOS) has so far proved resistant to 
information-hiding techniques, which help attackers covertly 
communicate. However, Siri—a native iOS service that controls 
iPhones and iPads via voice commands—could change this trend.  
 
Proliferating malware poses significant concerns for victims and security experts alike, and as 
the number of devices ripe for infection escalates, the amount of at-risk data will only continue 
to grow. A new form of mobile malware that uses information-hiding techniques to cover up 
malicious activities has been discovered in Android devices. While iOS devices such as iPads and 
iPhones have remained relatively secure, we discovered a way to hide information on the iOS 
system. We present our findings to help security experts better detect potential malware on the 
iOS platform.  
Background 
Information hiding enables attackers to communicate without being noticed by a third-party 
observer. Originally introduced for written secrets, information hiding is now a key element in 
effectively assessing network security. Desktop malware that has recently employed information 
hiding with some success includes Duqu and Alureon1 (using pictures to transmit stolen data to 
remote servers), Trojan.Zbot2 (downloading a jpeg that embeds a list of IP addresses to be 
inspected), and Linux.Fokirtor3 (injecting data within Secure Shell traffic to leak information to 
its command-and-control server). 
Because smartphones contain a range of personal and sensitive data, they have become a 
preferred target for stealing confidential information. Despite the rich set of features that can 
be exploited via data hiding, only a few malicious applications use these techniques due to 
mobile appliances’ relative newness compared with other computing devices.4 Recently, 
though, Android’s open source nature allowed hackers to develop a malware called 
Soundcomber,5 which covertly transmits the keys pressed during a call (for example, when a 
user enters his or her PIN to access a financial service).  
As iOS increases in popularity, it’s also attracting more malware developers. In April 2014, 
jailbroken iPhones and iPads were infected via a malicious dynamic library called Unflod.dylib.6 
When running, the library listens to outgoing Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connections to steal a 
user’s Apple ID and password, which are then leaked in plaintext. Although in this instance the 
absence of stealthiness partially mitigates the threat’s effectiveness, it’s only a matter of time 
before we’ll see new forms of malware that use information hiding to compromise the Apple 
ecosystem.  
We ourselves discovered a method—which we call iStegSiri—that we believe is the first 
attempt to covertly leak data from an iPhone or iPad without installing additional applications. 
Understanding this method can help security experts recognize and prevent similar future 
attacks.  
Cloaking Information 
Information hiding makes it possible to cloak a communication’s very existence; thus, it’s 
different from cryptography, in which a transmission’s content, though unreadable, is still overt. 
The two mechanisms are often used jointly—for example, to assure that a conversation remains 
unreadable. Data hiding is derived from steganography, which originally involved techniques 
like invisible ink or tattoos.1  
To exchange secrets, the two endpoints must agree on a scheme in advance and embed the 
secret message within a carrier: the more popular the carrier, the better the masking capacity. 
Too many alterations would reveal the embedded information’s presence, thus limiting the 
amount of data that can be covertly transmitted. For example, a carrier that injects secrets in 
the least significant bit (LSB) of a known set of an image’s pixels can be discovered due to its 
visible artifacts.  
For attackers exchanging secret data, current network datagrams and sophisticated Internet-
scale services offer the ideal choice.7 While early techniques focused on modifying unused fields 
of TCP/IP headers (for example, the IPv4 type of service field, which is rarely set by routers), 
more recent and sophisticated data-hiding methods include exploiting the traffic produced by 
popular services such as Skype or BitTorrent.8 From this perspective, modern smartphones offer 
a variety of new carriers, including cloud services, storage services like Dropbox, and voice-
based services like Siri.  
Siri 
Originally released as a standalone application in 2010, Siri has been offered as a native iOS 
service since 2011. It allows users to interact with their iPhone or iPad in two ways: by activating 
Siri and then giving commands such as creating a note or making a phone call, or by switching at 
any time from keyboard to voice for entering text. The translation of voice input to text is 
performed remotely in an Apple-operated server farm. The iPhone or iPad samples the voice, 
sends it to a remote facility, and waits for a response containing the recognized text, a similarity 
score, and a time stamp. Figure 1 depicts this usage pattern and architectural blueprint, which 
lead to an appreciable exchange of traffic between the two parties.9  
Because Apple has complete control over the application distribution pipeline, the diffusion 
of information-hiding methods has been efficiently tamed. Still, attackers can use Siri because 
information hiding doesn’t require the device’s alteration—or, in fact, any awareness on the 
device’s part—or the installation of additional software components.   
 
Figure 1. Siri’s usage pattern and architectural blueprint. 
Method, Limitations, and Countermeasures 
Siri processes a user’s voice with the Speex Codec, and the related data is transmitted to Apple 
as a sort of one-way voice-over-IP stream encrypted and encapsulated within HTTP. The main 
idea behind the method we discovered—iStegSiri—is controlling the “shape” of such traffic to 
embed secrets. For example, iStegSiri relies solely on specific audio patterns captured by Siri via 
the hosting device’s built-in microphone. Figure 2 depicts a scenario where iStegSiri is used to 
build a covert channel between an infected device and a botmaster to extract sensitive 
information (for example, a credit card number or Apple ID and password).6 
 
Figure 2. Exploiting iStegSiri for malware purposes. Infected smartphone utilizes native Siri service to control the 
“shape” of the network traffic embedding the secret data. 
Specifically, iStegSiri is based on three steps. In step 1, the secret message is converted to an 
audio sequence based on the proper alternation of voice and silence. In step 2, the sound 
pattern is provided to Siri as the input via the internal microphone. Consequently, the device will 
produce traffic toward the remote server that requires audio-to-text conversion. In step 3, the 
recipient of the secret communication passively inspects the conversation and, by observing a 
specific set of features, applies a decoding scheme to extract the secret information.  
Steps 1 and 2 require properly matching the offered audio and the produced throughput. A 
set of trials and past measurements9 demonstrated the feasibility of this approach. Algorithms 
used for synchronization, latency reduction, and packetization delay prevented forging the 
shape of the whole flow, even with a minimal degree of accuracy. To overcome this, we split the 
overall traffic into different components using a set of ranges for Siri’s protocol data units 
(PDUs). PDUs in the range of 800–900 bytes represented talk periods, while PDUs in the range of 
100–700 bytes represented inactive periods.  
With this partition, we were able to arbitrarily encode 1 and 0 within the traffic. In other 
words, alternating talk and silence periods increased or decreased the number of PDUs 
belonging to each defined range. Nevertheless, some form of voice activity detection (VAD) 
impedes high symbol rates, or the speed at which voice and silence alternates. In our trials, the 
shortest working values were one second and two seconds for voice and silence, respectively.  
 
Figure 3. iStegSiri’s crafted voice stream (a) results in the corresponding classes of traffic (blue=voice, red=silence) (b) 
which allows to successfully detect secret data bits at the receiving side (b). 
To complete Step 3, the covert listener must capture the traffic and decode the secret. The 
former can be achieved in several ways, including transparent proxies or probes that dump 
traffic for offline processing. The decoding algorithm implements a voting-like method using two 
decision windows to determine whether a run of throughput values belongs to voice or silence 
(1 or 0).  
Figure 3 depicts the outcome of a covert transmission. We found that the iStegSiri method 
can send secrets at a rate of about 0.5 bytes per second. For instance, a typical 16-digit credit 
card number can be transmitted in about 2 minutes. 
An attacker looking to exploit iStegSiri can access Siri functionalities in jailbroken devices 
through a library called Libactivator, or by directly accessing the private APIs provided by Apple 
in a plain environment. The malware can produce the audio track used to encode the secret at 
runtime, for example, by replicating a single sample via software, without having to inflate the 
size of the executable. Nevertheless, even if we used the microphone for the performance 
evaluation, audio data can be directly routed from the malware to the codec; it doesn’t have to 
be played back audibly by the user.  
 
As designed, iStegSiri has two main limitations, neither insurmountable for hackers: 
 It requires access to Siri’s inner workings; this means that only jailbroken iOS devices 
can currently be used. However, iStegSiri showcases the principle of using real-time 
voice traffic to embed data. Therefore, it can be further exploited on existing similar 
applications such as Google Voice or Shazam, or implemented in future applications 
by taking advantage of coding errors. 
 It requires access to the steganographically modified Siri traffic as the traffic travels 
to server facilities. However, as already suggested, this can be achieved in several 
ways, including transparent proxies or probes that dump traffic for offline 
processing. This somewhat shifts the threat from the application to the network, 
thus proper additional countermeasures must be evaluated. 
Because information-hiding methods use very specific technological traits, no current off-the-
shelf products effectively detect covert communications. This forces security experts to craft 
dedicated countermeasures for each method. With iStegSiri, the ideal countermeasure acts on 
the server side. For example, Apple should analyze patterns within the recognized text to 
determine if the sequence of words deviates significantly from the used language’s typical 
behaviors. Accordingly, the connection could be dropped to limit the covert communication’s 
data rate. This approach wouldn’t rely on the device, so additional functionalities or battery 
consumptions wouldn’t be required. We plan to further our research to develop an efficient 
countermeasure to mitigate this threat.  
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